

Testing the Optimality of Aggregate Consumption

Decisions: Is there Rule-of-Thumb Behavior?*

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Abstract

Consumption is an important macroeconomic aggregate, being about 70% of GNP. Finding sub-optimal behavior in consumption decisions casts a serious doubt on whether optimizing behavior is applicable on an economy-wide scale, which, in turn, challenge whether it is applicable at all.

This paper has several contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in a well known optimizing real-business-cycle model. Second, for rule-of-thumb tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates when lagged observables are used as instruments. However, these are exactly the instruments that have been traditionally used in this literature. Third, we show that nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T). We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution.

Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed

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in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. This forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio or a weighted portfolio of traded assets.

Using our setup, we find no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions in econometric tests. Indeed, we show that the simple representative agent model with a CRRA utility is able to explain the time series data on consumption and aggregate returns. There, the intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

1 Introduction

For the U.S. economy, there has been a large early literature using time-series data rejecting optimizing behavior in consumption generating some relevant puzzles; see Hall (1978), Flavin (1981), Mankiw (1981), Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983, 1984), Mehra and Prescott (1985), and Campbell and Deaton (1989). In two influential articles, following an initial idea in Hall and Mishkin (1982), Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990) extended the basic optimizing model incorporating rule-of-thumb behavior. There are two types of consumers: the first type consumes according to optimizing behavior but the second consumes only his/her current income. In this context, tests of no rule-of-thumb behavior are performed using the first order log-linearized version of the euler equation of the optimizing agent. Using G7

data, Campbell and Mankiw concluded that rule-of-thumb behavior was widespread. For the U.S. economy, about 50% of total income belongs to rule-of-thumb consumers. Evidence for other countries are even more “compelling.”

In econometric tests, whenever a specific null hypothesis is being tested, there are usually auxiliary hypothesis being tested as well. In Campbell and Mankiw’s case, when testing for the nonexistence of rule-of-thumb consumers, the auxiliary assumption is the validity of the first-order log-linearized version of the euler equation for optimizing consumers. Rejecting the null may be due to the inappropriateness of optimizing behavior or to the fact that the first-order log-linear approximation of the euler equation is a poor one (or both).

In this paper, we offer theoretical and econometric reasons to invalidate empirical results of current rule-of-thumb tests, showing that rule of thumb is not present when novel empirical tests are applied to U.S. data. First, using the dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), with no rule-of-thumb behavior, Issler and Vahid (2001) showed that there exists a linear combination of consumption and income growth that is unpredictable. This is exactly the implication that basic rule-of-thumb tests investigates. Observational equivalence implies that, even if one finds that income and consumption growth have similar short-run co-movement, one cannot conclude in favor of the presence of rule-of-thumb. Second, employing a generalized taylor expansion of the optimizing consumer’s euler equation, we consider what are the econometric consequences of ignoring high-order terms once a naïve first-order expansion is fitted to data. As one should expect, ignoring higher-order terms yields inconsistent estimates of the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers, invalidating hypothesis testing. Third, as is well known, this first-order expansion is only valid under stringent but testable restrictions. Using long-span U.S. data

on consumption, income and the return to aggregate capital, we provide evidence that these stringent restrictions are not valid. Moreover, when an appropriate novel rule-of-thumb test is applied to this same data set, we find no evidence of its presence.

The possibility of a positive bias for the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers in current tests was discussed by Weber (2002). He follows Cushing (1992), who argues that the combination of quadratic utility with habit formation implies that observed consumption growth is correctly modeled as a first order autoregressive-distributed lag function of growth in disposable income. Omission of this term in rule-of-thumb tests leads to a positive bias for the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers, since lagged income variation is highly positively correlated with the error term. This explains the large presence of rule-of-thumb consumers found by Campbell and Mankiw and in the literature that followed. A crucial step in Weber's result is to assume that habit formation is present in preferences.

Here we go one step further by using a generalized Taylor expansion approach. Regardless of the way one specifies preferences, unless the highly restrictive assumption that consumption growth and asset returns are log-Normal and homoskedastic is kept, we show that, once higher-order terms are omitted in running rule-of-thumb tests, all lagged observables are invalid instruments in log-linear regressions. But these are exactly the instruments that have been used in testing rule-of-thumb behavior up to now. Moreover, it is hard to find instruments other than lagged observables. Hence, our critique is much deeper than that of Weber's.

Once we fully characterized the problem, we searched for a robust test for the existence of rule-of-thumb consumers. As in Weber, we first employ the nonlinear Euler equation as a basis for testing. Weber's key insight is to realize that consumption of the optimizing agent

is aggregate consumption minus rule-of-thumb consumption. Thus, we can write the euler equation of the optimizing consumer in terms of observables and unknown parameters, and the generalized method-of-moments (GMM) can be used in estimation and as a basis for testing. Second, we argue that the efficient estimation of intertemporal substitution requires the use of all assets in the economy. This is a consequence of the fact that the Asset-Pricing Equation is valid for all traded securities and not for just a few. In other words, consumption should only respond to systematic changes in returns and individual returns can fluctuate because of idiosyncratic changes. Because it may be unfeasible to use all asset returns in the economy – if the number of time-observations is relatively small vis-a-vis the number of assets – we propose the cross-sectional aggregation of the nonlinear euler equation of individual returns, showing that the resulting aggregate equation can be viewed as the euler equation for the optimizing agent when he/she holds an equally-weighted portfolio of traded assets (or a weighted portfolio). In this context, aggregation is optimal, which follows from the work of Driscoll and Kraay (1998).

In a log-linear setting, the idea that the cross-sectional aggregation of individual returns follows closely intertemporal substitution was the key insight of Mulligan (2002). Here, we go one step further and show that we can perform cross-sectional aggregation of the euler equation for individual returns. This is feasible, interpretable, and also efficient when the number of cross-sectional units grows large, as argued in Driscoll and Kraay.

Attanasio and Weber (1995) show that the euler equation of an individual consumer is nonlinear on consumption. Therefore, aggregating euler equations across consumers using the techniques in Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) and Deaton (1985) does not yield the euler equation of a representative consumer. Despite that, euler equations can be cross-

sectionally aggregated across returns, since they are a linear function of individual returns. The aggregate euler equation will be that of a representative consumer who holds an equally-weighted portfolio of traded assets (or a weighted portfolio).

Empirically, we provide overwhelming evidence against rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers and against habit-formation in consumer preferences using novel tests. Our results are in sharp contrast to those in Campbell and Mankiw regarding rule of thumb and to those in Weber regarding habit formation. Indeed, we show that we can appropriately represent preferences for the U.S. consumer using a constant relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function: estimates of the annual discount factor are significant and range from 0.956 to 0.969, while those of the relative risk-aversion coefficient are also significant ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. Moreover, there is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests.

Our key result is that, once proper models and econometric techniques are applied to aggregate consumption, income, and aggregate return data, there is no reason to challenge optimizing behavior in consumption, as was the case with previous rule-of-thumb tests. We also show that augmented models for preferences such as consumption with habit formation are unnecessary to characterize intertemporal substitution. In that sense, our evidence reduces the fear that optimizing behavior is the exception, not the rule.

The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 presents the problem and our proposed solution. Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.

2 Testing Rule-of-Thumb Behavior in Consumption

2.1 The Standard Approach

The initial idea about rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption was proposed by Hall and Mishkin (1982) in a panel-data context. Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990) extended their setup making it operational using time-series techniques: interpreting aggregate regression coefficients and providing an econometric test for its presence at the aggregate level. Campbell and Mankiw have a basic restrictive framework, where optimizing consumers have quadratic utility, and a more general setup where optimizing behavior is consistent with the Asset Pricing Equation, albeit subject to the validity of a log-linear approximation.

Campbell and Mankiw's basic framework has two types of consumers: consumer of the first type (consumer 1) consumes according to optimizing behavior under quadratic utility. They impose Hall's (1978) restriction that the product of the discount rate and the one-period real return on wealth is equal to unity in every period, leading to the result that consumption of the optimizing agent is a martingale¹. The second type of consumer is restricted to consume his/her current income ($Y_{2,t}$), with no optimizing behavior. Income of the restricted consumer holds a fixed proportion (λ) to aggregate income as follows: $\lambda = \frac{Y_{2,t}}{Y_t}$, leading to the following relationship between aggregate consumption (C_t) and income (Y_t):

$$\Delta C_t = \delta + \lambda \Delta Y_t + (1 - \lambda) \eta_t, \tag{1}$$

¹Alternatively, we can think of the optimizing agent following the permanent-income framework as proposed by Flavin (1981).

or, to a logarithmic approximation:

$$\Delta \ln(C_t) = \delta + \lambda \Delta \ln(Y_t) + (1 - \lambda) \eta_t, \quad (2)$$

where η_t is unpredictable, since it is an innovation regarding the optimizing agent's information set.

Because the framework of quadratic utility is too restrictive, Campbell and Mankiw expanded their basic framework to deal with the (Asset) Pricing Equation, using an aggregate return to wealth (R_{t+1}):

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \beta \frac{u'(C_{t+1})}{u'(C_t)} R_{t+1} \right\} = 1, \quad (3)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_t(\cdot)$ denotes the conditional expectation given the information available at time t , $u'(\cdot) > 0$ is the first derivative of the utility function, and $\beta \in (0, 1)$. Under the same structure as before – one optimizing agent whose consumption obeys (3) and one restricted agent whose consumption equals λY_t – they obtain:

$$\Delta \ln(C_t) = \lambda \Delta \ln(Y_t) + (1 - \lambda) \left(\frac{1}{\phi} \ln(\beta) + \frac{\phi}{2} \sigma_\mu^2 + \frac{1}{\phi} r_t \right) + \mu_t, \quad (4)$$

where it is assumed that $u'(C_t) = C_t^{-\phi}$, with ϕ representing the constant relative risk-aversion coefficient, and $r_t = \ln(R_t)$. Again, the error term μ_t is unpredictable, since it is an innovation regarding the optimizing agent's information set.

Testing the presence of rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption amounts to a statistical test of the null hypothesis $H_0 : \lambda = 0$ either in (2) or in (4), where estimation is done using instrumental-variable techniques. Under H_0 , non-optimizing consumers have zero income and are therefore negligible.

The conditions under which equations (1) (or (2)) and (4) are derived are very stringent. On the one hand, the former requires utility to be quadratic on consumption. On the

other hand, log-linearizing (3) leading to (4) requires joint conditional log-Normality and homoskedasticity of $\left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}}, R_t\right)'$, yielding:

$$\Delta \ln(C_t) = \frac{1}{\phi} \ln(\beta) + \frac{\phi}{2} \sigma_\mu^2 + \frac{1}{\phi} r_t + \mu_t, \quad (5)$$

where $\mu_t | \Omega_{t-1} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\mu^2)$, with Ω_{t-1} representing the information set of the optimizing agent.

The fact that μ_t is conditionally Gaussian and uncorrelated with elements of the conditioning set Ω_{t-1} implies that μ_t and μ_{t-s} , $s > 0$ are independent. Moreover, μ_t must be independent of any function of the variables in Ω_{t-1} . In principle, residual-based tests of normality, conditional homoskedasticity, and independence can be used to ensure that these restrictions apply to μ_t . In particular, we employ the Jarque and Bera (1987) test for normal errors, the LM serial correlation test, the ARCH test for homoskedasticity, and the Brock et al.'s (1996) BDS test for independence.

2.2 Observational Equivalence: A Critique of the Basic Model

Testing Rule-of-Thumb

As stressed in Issler and Vahid (2001), in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), output, consumption and investment share co-movements (or have common features) as a result of the optimizing behavior of the representative agent. Under log-utility, full-depreciation of the capital stock, and Cobb-Douglas technology, the closed-form solutions for the logarithms of output or income (Y_t),

consumption (C_t), and investment (I_t), are, respectively:

$$\begin{aligned}\log(Y_t) &= \log(X_t^p) + \bar{y} + \pi_{yk} \widehat{k}_t \\ \log(C_t) &= \log(X_t^p) + \bar{c} + \pi_{ck} \widehat{k}_t \\ \log(I_t) &= \log(X_t^p) + \bar{i} + \pi_{ik} \widehat{k}_t,\end{aligned}\tag{6}$$

where $\log(X_t^p) = \mu + \log(X_{t-1}^p) + \varepsilon_t^p$ is the random-walk productivity process, \bar{y} , \bar{c} and \bar{i} are the steady-state values of $\log(Y_t/X_t^p)$, $\log(C_t/X_t^p)$, and $\log(I_t/X_t^p)$ respectively, and π_{jk} , $j = y, c, i$ is the elasticity of variable j with respect to deviations of the capital stock from its stationary value (\widehat{k}_t).

Focusing on the first two equations in (6), it is straightforward to verify that:

$$\Delta \log(C_t) = \frac{\pi_{ck}}{\pi_{yk}} \Delta \log(Y_t) + \frac{\pi_{ck} - \pi_{yk}}{\pi_{yk}} (\mu + \varepsilon_t^p).\tag{7}$$

where ε_t^p is the innovation of the productivity process $\log(X_t^p)$.

Recall now the basic setup with quadratic utility in Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990), represented by equation (2). It is straightforward to conclude that (7) and (2) are observationally equivalent, with $\frac{\pi_{ck}}{\pi_{yk}} = \lambda$, $\frac{\pi_{ck} - \pi_{yk}}{\pi_{yk}} \mu = \delta$, and $\frac{\pi_{ck} - \pi_{yk}}{\pi_{yk}} \varepsilon_t^p = (1 - \lambda) \eta_t$. Thus, validating (2) with data cannot be used to support the existence of rule-of-thumb behavior, since it also validates the optimizing behavior behind (6).

2.3 A Generalized Taylor-Expansion Approach: A Critique of Usual Log-Linear Approximations of the Asset-Pricing Equation Applied to Rule-of-Thumb Tests

The starting point of our approach is the Asset-Pricing Equation (or Pricing Equation, for short):

$$\mathbb{E}_t \{M_{t+1}x_{i,t+1}\} = p_{i,t}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N, \text{ or} \quad (8)$$

$$\mathbb{E}_t \{M_{t+1}R_{i,t+1}\} = 1, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N, \quad (9)$$

where M_t is the stochastic discount factor, $p_{i,t}$ denotes the price of the i -th asset at time t , $x_{i,t+1}$ denotes the payoff of the i -th asset in $t + 1$, $R_{i,t+1} = \frac{x_{i,t+1}}{p_{i,t}}$ denotes the gross return of the i -th asset in $t + 1$, and N is the number of assets in the economy.

We assume that the Pricing Equation (9) holds and that the stochastic discount factor obeys $M_t = \beta \frac{u'(C_t)}{u'(C_{t-1})} > 0$, where $\beta \in (0, 1)$, and $u'(\cdot) > 0$ is consumption's marginal utility. Following Araujo and Issler (2008), we consider a generalized Taylor expansion of the exponential function around x , with increment h , as follows:

$$e^{x+h} = e^x + he^x + \frac{h^2 e^{x+\lambda(h) \cdot h}}{2}, \text{ with } \lambda(h) : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow (0, 1). \quad (10)$$

For the expansion of a generic function, $\lambda(\cdot)$ would depend on x and h . However, dividing (10) by e^x :

$$e^h = 1 + h + \frac{h^2 e^{\lambda(h) \cdot h}}{2}, \quad (11)$$

shows that (11) does not depend on x . Indeed, we can get a closed-form solution for $\lambda(\cdot)$ as

function of h alone².

To connect (11) with the Pricing Equation (9), we let $h = \ln(M_t R_{i,t})$ to obtain:

$$M_t R_{i,t} = 1 + \ln(M_t R_{i,t}) + \frac{[\ln(M_t R_{i,t})]^2 e^{\lambda(\ln(M_t R_{i,t})) \cdot \ln(M_t R_{i,t})}}{2}. \quad (12)$$

It is important to stress that (12) is not an approximation but an exact relationship. The behavior of $M_t R_{i,t}$ is governed solely by that of $\ln(M_t R_{i,t})$. It is useful to define a random variable collecting the higher-order term in (12):

$$z_{i,t} \equiv \frac{1}{2} \times [\ln(M_t R_{i,t})]^2 e^{\lambda(\ln(M_t R_{i,t})) \cdot \ln(M_t R_{i,t})}.$$

Notice that $z_{i,t}$ is a function of $\ln(M_t R_{i,t})$ alone and that $z_{i,t} \geq 0$ for all (i, t) . Taking the conditional expectation of both sides of (12), imposing the Pricing Equation and rearranging terms gives:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t}) = -\mathbb{E}_{t-1}\{\ln(M_t R_{i,t})\}. \quad (13)$$

To ensure that $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})$ exists we constrain the process $\{\ln(M_t R_{i,t})\}$ so that its conditional expectation is well defined. Weak-stationarity of $\{\ln(M_t R_{i,t})\}$ is a sufficient condition for that. Let $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_t \equiv (\varepsilon_{1,t}, \varepsilon_{2,t}, \dots, \varepsilon_{N,t})'$ stack the conditional mean of the individual forecast errors $\varepsilon_{i,t} = \ln(M_t \mathbf{R}_{i,t}) - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\{\ln(M_t \mathbf{R}_{i,t})\}$. From the definition of $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_t$ we have:

$$\ln(M_t \mathbf{R}_t) = \mathbb{E}_{t-1}\{\ln(M_t \mathbf{R}_t)\} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_t. \quad (14)$$

Starting with (14), denoting $r_{i,t} = \ln(R_{i,t})$, $m_t = \ln(M_t)$, and using $-\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t}) =$

²This solution is:

$$\lambda(h) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{h} \times \ln \left[\frac{2 \times (e^h - 1 - h)}{h^2} \right], & h \neq 0 \\ 1/3, & h = 0. \end{cases}$$

$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \{\ln(M_t R_{i,t})\}$, we get:

$$r_{i,t} = -m_t - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N. \quad (15)$$

Within a CCAPM framework, we specialize letting $u(C_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\phi}-1}{1-\phi}$, for $\phi \neq 1$, and $u(C_t) = \ln(C_t)$, for $\phi = 1$, i.e., the canonical form for $u(C_t)$, which gives,

$$\Delta \ln(C_t) = \frac{\ln(\beta)}{\phi} + \frac{1}{\phi} r_{i,t} + \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})}{\phi} + \mu_{i,t}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N, \quad (16)$$

where $\mu_{i,t} = -\frac{\varepsilon_{i,t}}{\phi}$.

It is important to stress that $\frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})}{\phi}$ captures the effect of the higher-order terms of the Taylor expansion, in general it will be a function of the variables in the conditioning set used by the econometrician to compute $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\cdot)$. Therefore, omission of $\frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})}{\phi}$ (or of parts of it) in estimating (16) will generate an omitted-variable bias. This will turn out to be a major problem for versions of (16) usually estimated in the rule-of-thumb literature³.

Using (16), we can write:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \ln(C_t) &= \frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} \ln(\beta) + \lambda \Delta \ln(Y_t) + \frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} r_{i,t} \\ &\quad + \frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t}) + (1-\lambda) \mu_{i,t}, \quad \text{for all } i \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

where the only difference between (17) and Campbell and Mankiw's setup (i.e., (4)) is the inclusion of the term $\frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})$ and the fact that we are considering N assets in the economy instead of just one.

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Notice that (16) is a generalized version of (5) when we consider several assets instead of just one. We do not impose any distributional assumptions on $\mu_{i,t}$ and the higher order term $\frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})}{\phi}$ shows naturally in it. Homoskedasticity in deriving (5) conveniently imposes that $\frac{\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})}{\phi}$ is constant, which is very restrictive.

When $\lambda = 0$, there is no rule-of-thumb behavior, therefore a critical issue in testing the null hypothesis $H_0 : \lambda = 0$ is to obtain consistent estimates for λ . Suppose that the term $\frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})$ is omitted in running (17). Then, the error term becomes correlated with all the variables in the conditioning set used by the econometrician to compute $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})$. However, these are the same variables used as instruments in past empirical studies. Within this context, omitting $\frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})$ results in inconsistent instrumental-variable (IV) estimates for λ and invalid inference when testing $H_0 : \lambda = 0$.

Notice that, in general, it is impossible to determine whether $\text{plim}_{T \rightarrow \infty} \widehat{\lambda}_{IV} - \lambda \leq 0$. However, since most macroeconomic variables are pro-cyclical, it is very likely that $\text{plim}_{T \rightarrow \infty} \widehat{\lambda}_{IV} - \lambda > 0$ when $\frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})$ is omitted, leading IV estimates to have an upward asymptotic bias, explaining why so many macroeconomic studies rejected $H_0 : \lambda = 0$ in favor of $H_A : \lambda > 0$; see Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and most of the literature that followed.

Inconsistency of IV estimates is a result of omitting the term $\frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_{i,t})$ in running (17). However, the only reason why this term is present in (17) is because we use a log-linear approximation of the Pricing Equation (9). We can circumvent the problem if we do not try to log-linearize the Pricing Equation. This was exactly the approach taken by Weber (2002), who proposed an alternative way of testing rule-of-thumb behavior employing the non-linear equation (9) directly. We must stress that Weber did not motivate his framework by using the log-linearization argument employed here. We advance from Weber in the understanding of the problem by considering the expansion (12). Because of that, we are able to show that lagged observables are correlated with the error term due to omitted higher-order terms. This is a much deeper critique of the rule-of-thumb approach in Campbell and Mankiw than Weber's. Indeed, since almost all past rule-of-thumb empirical studies used lagged

observables as instruments, and omitted higher-order terms, their empirical findings may be invalid.

Using a nonlinear instrumental variable estimator – a generalized method-of-moment (GMM) estimator – Weber employed directly (9) to estimate structural parameters and test $H_0 : \lambda = 0$. He shows that we can write the optimizing agent’s consumption ($C_{1,t}$) as a function of observables since, under rule-of-thumb behavior:

$$C_{1,t} = C_t - \lambda Y_t. \tag{18}$$

Because the optimizing agent obeys the euler equation (9), we could use GMM to estimate the structural parameters associated with the optimizing agent as well as λ in:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \beta \frac{u'(C_t - \lambda Y_t)}{u'(C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})} R_{i,t} \right\} = 1, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N, \tag{19}$$

for a given choice of $u'(\cdot)$.

The only difference between (19) and Weber’s setup is the fact that we are considering N assets in the economy instead of just one. We now try to justify the use of a disaggregated setup for asset returns.

Most past empirical studies in consumption completely ignored the fact that the optimizing agent decides on consumption when faced with the prospects of expected discounted returns on N assets, such as in the system of equations in (19). Efficient estimation of preference and other parameters in the system requires estimating the whole system instead of just a portion of it. This happens for the same reason why single-equation OLS estimation is less efficient than SUR estimation in the context of linear regressions. System estimation may pose a problem in this context, since, in principle, the number of traded assets (N) in a real economy is large relative to the number of time-series observations (T). Indeed, if

$N \rightarrow \infty$ with fixed T , estimating the whole system is unfeasible and full-efficiency cannot be attained. Most of the literature opted to limit the size of N , e.g., $N = 2$: a risky and a “riskless” asset or, at most, a handful of assets. Of course, this solution is sub-optimal at the cost of efficiency.

In an interesting paper, Mulligan (2002) shows that an alternative to estimating the system as a whole is cross-sectional aggregation, where we do not throw away useful information contained in $R_{i,t}$, $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$, but rather aggregate it to isolate the common component of asset returns; see also the equivalent approach in Araujo and Issler (2008). The idea behind cross-sectional aggregation is that intertemporal substitution is a consequence of changes that affect all returns, i.e., to systematic changes in returns, since idiosyncratic movements in $R_{i,t}$ do not affect aggregate consumption. If N is sufficiently large (or $N \rightarrow \infty$) cross-sectional aggregation will deliver the common component of returns associated with intertemporal substitution.

As Campbell and Mankiw, Mulligan starts with a log-linear approximation of the Pricing Equation (9) such as (16). In what follows we present a stylized version of Mulligan to be able to discuss the problems related with approximating (9). Consider the sequence of deterministic weights $\{\omega_i\}_{i=1}^N$, such that $|\omega_i| < \infty$ uniformly on N , with $\sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i = 1$ or $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i = 1$, depending on whether we allow or not the existence of an infinite number of assets. Cross-sectional aggregation of (16) implies:

$$\Delta \ln(C_t) = \frac{1}{\phi} \ln(\beta) + \frac{1}{\phi} r_t + \frac{1}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_t) + \mu_t, \quad (20)$$

where $r_t = \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i r_{i,t}$ is the logarithm of the *return to the geometric average of aggregate capital*, $z_t = \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i z_{i,t}$, and $\mu_t = \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i \mu_{i,t}$. Notice that we can specialize $\omega_i = 1/N$ to

use equal weights in aggregation. Despite aggregating returns, Mulligan omits the term $\frac{1}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_t)$ in estimating (20), potentially leading to an omitted-variable bias.

From an econometric point-of-view, the cross-sectional aggregation leading to (20) is very similar to the theoretical approach of Driscoll and Kraay (1998), although the latter is more general because it also applies if the setup is non-linear. They use orthogonality conditions of the form $\mathbb{E}(h(\theta, w_{i,t})) = 0$, $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$. If N is large relative to T , GMM estimation is not feasible, since we cannot estimate consistently the variance-covariance matrix of the sample moments. Despite that, since for all i the orthogonality conditions hold, we can form a cross-sectional average $\tilde{h}(\theta) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N h(\theta, w_{i,t})$, and estimate θ by GMM from $\mathbb{E}(\tilde{h}(\theta)) = 0$. Under a set of standard assumptions, Driscoll and Kraay prove consistency and asymptotic normality for the GMM estimates of θ . That happens whether N is fixed or $N \rightarrow \infty$ at any rate. Here, despite specializing to $\omega_i = 1/N$, cross-sectional aggregation is also the solution to the problem of excess of orthogonality conditions.

It is important to stress that, although the approach in Mulligan is inappropriate if the log-linear approximation of (9) is invalid, it is a clever way of preserving information on all returns that would otherwise be lost if N is large relative to T .

In what follows, we show how to circumvent not only the problem of aggregation but also the problem of using a log-linear approximation of (9). Start with a system of euler equations for the unconstrained consumer (19):

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \beta \frac{u'(C_t - \lambda Y_t)}{u'(C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})} R_{i,t} \right\} = 1, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N. \quad (21)$$

Notice that (21) is a linear function of returns $R_{i,t}$, since the conditional expectation $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}(\cdot)$ is a linear operator and the term in brackets is a linear function of $R_{i,t}$. Consider X_{t-1} , a

k -vector of instruments, dated in $t-1$ or before, common to all equations in (21). Centering (21), post-multiply the result by X_{t-1} and use the law of iterated expectations to achieve:

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ \left[\beta \frac{u'(C_t - \lambda Y_t)}{u'(C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})} R_{i,t} - 1 \right] \otimes X_{t-1} \right\} = 0, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N. \quad (22)$$

Label now:

$$h(\theta, w_t, w_{i,t}) = \left[\beta \frac{u'(C_t - \lambda Y_t)}{u'(C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})} R_{i,t} - 1 \right] \otimes X_{t-1}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, N.$$

where the w 's denote data, and θ stacks β , the preference parameters in $u'(\cdot)$, and, more importantly, λ .

There are $N \times k$ orthogonality conditions in (22). If N is large relative to T , estimating the variance-covariance matrix of sample means will be infeasible, or poorly estimated, even if it is feasible; see Driscoll and Kraay for a discussion of the latter. If we cross-sectionally aggregate (22), we obtain:

$$\tilde{h}(\theta) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N h(\theta, w_t, w_{i,t}) = \left[\beta \frac{u'(C_t - \lambda Y_t)}{u'(C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})} R_t - 1 \right] \otimes X_{t-1},$$

where $R_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N R_{i,t}$ is the cross-sectional average of all returns. Notice that we can still estimate θ by GMM using:

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ \tilde{h}(\theta) \right\} = \mathbb{E} \left\{ \left[\beta \frac{u'(C_t - \lambda Y_t)}{u'(C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})} R_t - 1 \right] \otimes X_{t-1} \right\} = 0, \quad (23)$$

but now we only have a system of k orthogonality conditions, regardless of the size of N .

An interesting feature of this approach is that estimation is feasible without having to throw away any information about asset returns. It works for any size of N and even if $N \rightarrow \infty$, at any rate. Moreover, the euler equation behind the moment restrictions in (23) are interpretable and can be viewed as that of the optimizing representative agent who holds

an equally-weighted portfolio of traded assets $R_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N R_{i,t}$ in every period. In a large N environment, this return will be $R_t = \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N R_{i,t}$. If we use deterministic weights $\{\omega_i\}_{i=1}^N$ in aggregating (22), as discussed above, then $R_t = \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i R_{i,t}$ can be interpreted as a weighted portfolio.

The way cross-section aggregation of returns works here is in sharp contrast with the early literature on consumption aggregation of the euler equation; see Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985), Deaton (1985) and Attanasio and Weber (1995). There, the problem lies with the fact that $\beta \frac{u'(C_{i,t})}{u'(C_{i,t-1})}$ is a nonlinear function of individual consumption $C_{i,t}$, which generates an aggregation bias for euler equations estimated using aggregate consumption C_t .

Given a choice of $u'(\cdot)$, we can estimate consistently the structural parameters in (23) and test $H_0 : \lambda = 0$ by means of a simple wald test. This is exactly the approach taken here.

In what follows, we employ two different specifications for preferences of the unconstrained agent in testing rule-of-thumb. The first is CRRA (or Power) utility, where:

$$u(C_{1,t}) = \frac{C_{1,t}^{1-\phi} - 1}{1-\phi} = \frac{(C_t - \lambda Y_t)^{1-\phi} - 1}{1-\phi}. \quad (24)$$

The second considers that the optimizing agent has external habit formation (Abel (1990)), with $u(\cdot)$ as follows:

$$u(C_{1,t}, \overline{C_{1,t-1}}) = \frac{[(C_t - \lambda Y_t) - \gamma (C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})]^{1-\phi} - 1}{1-\phi}, \quad (25)$$

where $\overline{C_{1,t-1}}$ is treated parametrically in the optimization problem.

The case where preferences are represented by (25) was studied by Weber. He did not reject $H_0 : \lambda = 0$, but rejected $H_0 : \gamma = 0$ in favor of the presence of external habit. As we argue next, the issue of cross-sectional aggregation of returns was not properly taken into

account by Weber. Indeed, he used the after-tax average yield on new issues of 6 month Treasury bills. Since the marginal rate of substitution in consumption is only sensible to systematic changes in real returns, and there is little reason for the real yield of the 6-month Treasury bill to be a good proxy for these systematic changes, it is interesting to confront the empirical results in Weber with the ones found here when a proxy for $R_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N R_{i,t}$ or $R_t = \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i R_{i,t}$ is used instead. Indeed, Mulligan argues that “the interest rate in aggregate theory is not the promised yield on a Treasury Bill or Bond, but should be measured as the expected return on a representative piece of capital.”

The measure proposed by Mulligan is the return to aggregate capital \bar{R}_t , or the capital rental rate (after income and property taxes). To make the case for this measure as stark as possible, we assume log-utility for preferences – where $M_{t+i} = \beta \frac{C_t}{C_{t+i}}$, $i = 1, 2, \dots$, and $M_t = \beta \frac{C_{t-1}}{C_t}$ – as well as no production. Dividends are equal to consumption in every period, and the price of the portfolio representing aggregate capital \bar{p}_t can be computed with the usual expected present-value formula:

$$\bar{p}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} M_{t+i} C_{t+i} \right\} = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \beta^i \frac{C_t}{C_{t+i}} C_{t+i} \right\} = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} C_t.$$

Hence, the return on aggregate capital \bar{R}_t is given by:

$$\bar{R}_t = \frac{\bar{p}_t + C_t}{\bar{p}_{t-1}} = \frac{\beta C_t + (1 - \beta) C_t}{\beta C_{t-1}} = \frac{C_t}{\beta C_{t-1}} = \frac{1}{M_t}, \quad (26)$$

which is the reciprocal of M_t .

Equation (26) shows that changes in \bar{R}_t are associated with intertemporal substitution. However, changes in individual assets will only be associated with intertemporal substitution when they reflect systematic changes in returns.

3 Empirical Results

3.1 Data

The critical series used in this study is the capital rental rate after income and property taxes, as computed in Mulligan (2002)⁴. This series was calculated in annual frequency, from 1947 to 1997. The rest of the data used were extracted from the U.S. National Income and Product Account (NIPA) and from the US Census Bureau. From NIPA we extracted annual data for real disposable personal income, real consumption of nondurable and services, and real consumption of nondurables. To obtain per capita series we used population data from the US Census Bureau.

3.2 Econometric Issues in GMM Estimation

As in any study employing GMM techniques it is important to choose instruments properly. Tauchen (1986), Mao (1990), and Fuhrer et al. (1995) have found that GMM performs better with instrument sets including only a few lags of the observables in the equation being estimated. As a general rule, we follow this strategy avoiding a weak-instrument problem.

Regardless whether we use (24) or (25) to represent preferences, we must guarantee that the series in the euler equation are not integrated of order one. Since consumption and income are known to have roots of the autoregressive polynomial equal (or nearly equal to) to unity, we transform them to achieve stationarity within the euler equation. In the context of rule-of-thumb tests, Weber (2002) discusses this issue at some length, dividing euler equations by specific powers of Y_t to generate non-integrated terms. These powers

⁴We thank Casey Mulligan for providing this series to us.

depend on the form of preferences. Here, we opted for a slightly different route. For the preferences in (24) or (25), dividing euler equations by C_{t-1} generates terms that have the following formats: gross growth rates of consumption or income, income-to-consumption or consumption-to-income ratios, or products of them.

Because we use two possible representations for preferences – (24) or (25) – and either rule-of-thumb or not ($\lambda = 0$ or $\lambda \neq 0$), we estimate four euler equations by GMM. We list below these four equations in untransformed and transformed formats, where it becomes apparent the transformations that were performed in order to achieve stationarity. The stationary ratios are defined as: $ra_{1,t} \equiv \frac{Y_t}{C_t}$, $ra_{2,t} \equiv \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}}$, $ra_{3,t} \equiv \frac{C_t}{Y_{t-1}}$, $ra_{4,t} \equiv \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}}$, $ra_{5,t} \equiv \frac{C_t}{C_{t-2}}$, $ra_{6,t} \equiv \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-2}}$, $ra_{7,t} = \frac{C_{t-1}}{C_t}$.

1. Unconstrained agent with external habit and rule-of-thumb in aggregating consumption. The untransformed model is:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \beta [R_t + \gamma] [(C_t - \lambda Y_t) - \gamma (C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1})]^{-\phi} \\ - R_t \beta^2 \gamma [(C_{t+1} - \lambda Y_{t+1}) - \gamma (C_t - \lambda Y_t)]^{-\phi} \\ - [(C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1}) - \gamma (C_{t-2} - \lambda Y_{t-2})]^{-\phi} \end{array} \right\} = 0.$$

Collecting terms and multiplying the above equation by $\frac{1}{C_{t-1}}$ gives the following trans-

formed model⁵:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \beta [R_t + \gamma] \left[\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \left(1 - \lambda \frac{Y_{t-1}}{C_{t-1}} \right) \right]^{-\phi} \\ - R_t \beta^2 \gamma \left[\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_{t+1}}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}} \right) \right]^{-\phi} \\ - \left[1 - \lambda \frac{Y_{t-1}}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \left(\left(\frac{C_{t-1}}{C_{t-2}} \right)^{-1} - \lambda \left(\frac{C_{t-1}}{Y_{t-2}} \right)^{-1} \right) \right]^{-\phi} \end{array} \right\} = 0. \quad (27)$$

2. Unconstrained agent with external habit and no rule-of-thumb in aggregating consumption. The untransformed model is:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} R_t \beta (C_t - \gamma C_{t-1})^{-\phi} - R_t \beta^2 \gamma (C_{t+1} - \gamma C_t)^{-\phi} - (C_{t-1} - \gamma C_{t-2})^{-\phi} \\ + \gamma \beta (C_t - \gamma C_{t-1})^{-\phi} \end{array} \right\} = 0.$$

Collecting terms and multiplying the above equation by $\frac{1}{C_{t-1}}$ gives the following transformed model:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \beta [R_t + \gamma] \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \right)^{-\phi} - R_t \beta^2 \gamma \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \right)^{-\phi} \\ - \left(1 - \gamma \frac{C_{t-2}}{C_{t-1}} \right)^{-\phi} \end{array} \right\} = 0. \quad (28)$$

3. Unconstrained agent with CRRA utility and rule-of-thumb in aggregating consumption. The untransformed model is:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left[\beta \left(\frac{C_t - \lambda Y_t}{C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1}} \right)^{-\phi} R_t - 1 \right] = 0.$$

⁵Notice that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{C_t}{Y_{t-1}} &= \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \times \frac{C_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}}, \\ \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}} &= \frac{Y_t}{C_t} \times \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}}, \\ \frac{C_t}{C_{t-2}} &= \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \times \frac{C_{t-1}}{C_{t-2}}, \text{ and,} \\ \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-2}} &= \frac{Y_t}{C_t} \times \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \times \frac{C_{t-1}}{C_{t-2}}. \end{aligned}$$

Dividing the numerator and denominator of $\frac{C_t - \lambda Y_t}{C_{t-1} - \lambda Y_{t-1}}$ by C_{t-1} , gives,

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \beta \left(\frac{\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}}}{1 - \lambda \frac{Y_{t-1}}{C_{t-1}}} \right)^{-\phi} R_t - 1 \right\} = 0 \quad (29)$$

4. Unconstrained agent with CRRA utility and rule-of-thumb in aggregating consumption. The model is already in stationary form:

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left[\beta \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \right)^{-\phi} R_t - 1 \right] = 0. \quad (30)$$

3.3 Log-Linear Models and Diagnostic Tests

Table 1 reports the result of IV estimation of the log-linearized version of the euler equation following the standard approach – ignoring higher-order terms. We also perform residual-based specification tests. Two proxies of consumption are used: non durables and services per capita, and non durables per capita. All estimates of $1/\phi$ are precise, and range from 0.689 to 0.994, which implies a value for ϕ between 1.006 and 1.452. Sargan’s over-identifying-restriction test does not reject the null for any of the regressions run. Up to now, our results are in line with those of Mulligan (2002).

In Table 1, residual-based tests (normality, conditional homoskedasticity, serial correlation and independence) show signs of misspecification. At the 5% significance level, all regressions except one fail the test for independence. At 10%, all regressions fail the test for independence and all regressions involving non-durable consumption also fail the ARCH test. Notwithstanding, normality tests show no signs of rejection.

Diagnostic-test results illustrate the basic problem with the log-linear approximation of the Pricing Equation. If we omit the term $\frac{1}{\phi} \mathbb{E}_{t-1}(z_t)$ in running (20), the composite error term would be a function of lagged observables, therefore cannot be independent. This is

captured in the results of the BDS tests. If we focus only on second-order terms for the log-linear approximation, misspecification was captured by ARCH-test results.

Normality and absence of serial correlation are not sufficient to guarantee the validity of the log-linearized model. Second order non-correlation is also required to imply independence under normality. However, the failure in ARCH tests are evidence to the contrary⁶. In a personal account, Granger (2008) comments that the exact same issue was particularly important for the birth of ARCH models (Engle (1982)) in relation to the birth of optimizing behavior in consumption (Hall (1978)). As he recalls, “I [suggested that] functions of uncorrelated series could be autocorrelated... [Hall] had several equations with residuals having no serial correlation. I suggested ... that the squares of these residuals might not be white noise... [Using] the same data that Hall had used, [Engle] performed the identical regressions, obtained the residuals, squared them, and found quite strong autocorrelations.”

Still using the capital rental rate as the aggregate return, we now implement Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) procedure in testing for rule-of-thumb behavior. Results are reported in Table 2. First, we note that $(1 - \lambda) / \phi$ – the coefficient of the aggregate return – is not significant for any instrument list and consumption measure used here. Income growth becomes significant when we use more than one lag for instruments. When λ is significant, estimates range from 0.300 to 0.559, in line with the findings of Campbell and Mankiw. Sargan-test results are also line with theirs – the null is never rejected.

⁶We must stress that we found evidence of heteroskedasticity at the annual frequency. However, log-linearization of the euler equation is applicable at any frequency. In the literature, some empirical tests were implemented at a quarterly frequency, where we believe that the evidence of misspecification in testing would be much stronger.

Despite these findings, diagnostic-test results show signs of misspecification – except for one regression. The strongest rejections are for the BDS test, although serial correlation and ARCH tests are also significant for non-durable consumption. As before, the Jarque and Bera (1987) test does not reject the null of normal errors.

Even discarding diagnostic-test results, since $(1 - \lambda) / \phi$ is insignificant in all regressions, we are back to Campbell and Mankiw’s basic setup: quadratic utility with rule-of-thumb applying to consumption and income alone. Here, because of the observational equivalence result in Section 2.2, we cannot conclude that λ indeed measures the proportion of rule-of-thumb agents. It might be an estimate of $\frac{\pi_{ck}}{\pi_{yk}}$ in King, Plosser and Rebelo’s (1988) optimizing model.

3.4 Non-Linear Models and Rule-of-Thumb Tests

In Table 3, we present results of the general model estimated in Weber (2002), where the unconstrained agent has external habit and there is rule-of-thumb behavior, i.e., equation (27). At the 5% significance level, we cannot reject $H_0 : \lambda = 0$ in any estimated regression. Thus, as in Weber, there is no sign of rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption in the presence of external habit. However, contrary to Weber’s results, with one exception, we cannot reject $H_0 : \gamma = 0$ in testing at 5%, which is evidence that there is no habit formation in preferences. To examine this issue further, we also performed a joint wald test with $H_0 : (\lambda, \gamma)' = (0, 0)'$, which presented overwhelming evidence that the null is true. It is also worth noting that the intertemporal discount rate β is always significant, with estimates ranging from 0.955 to 0.974, and that the relative risk aversion coefficient ϕ is always significant too, with estimates

ranging from 1.010 to 1.369. Moreover, in all cases, Hansen’s (1982) $T \times J$ test did not reject the implicit over-identifying restrictions.

Table 4 shows the results of estimation of equation (28) – the euler equation for the unconstrained agent with external habit and no rule-of-thumb in aggregating consumption. Recall that this specification is the preferred one in Weber’s consumption study, who finds empirical support for external habit, but not for rule of thumb. Here, however, the habit formation parameter γ is insignificant for all consumption measures and group of instruments, while the intertemporal discount rate β and the risk aversion coefficient ϕ are significant everywhere, ranging from 0.956 to 0.966, and 0.790 to 0.958, respectively. Overall, contrary to Weber’s findings, the results in Table 4 show no sign of external habit, since the null that $\gamma = 0$ is not rejected anywhere in wald tests. As we stressed before, the use of the capital rental rate is critical for the latter result. Here, instead of dispensing with information contained on the set of all returns, we use this information by aggregating returns into the capital rental rate as computed by Mulligan (2002). Again, Hansen’s (1982) $T \times J$ test did not reject any of the implicit over-identifying restrictions.

Table 5 considers the estimation of equation (29) – unconstrained agent with CRRA utility and rule-of-thumb in aggregating consumption. There is no sign of rejection for Hansen’s $T \times J$ over-identifying-restriction test. The discount rate β and the risk aversion coefficient ϕ are both significant everywhere – the first ranging from 0.953 to 0.968 and the second from 0.522 to 1.040. The null that $\lambda = 0$ is not rejected for any consumption measure and group of instruments. Overall, results from Tables 3 and 5 show no evidence of rule-of-thumb behavior. This contrasts with evidence presented by Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990) and in most references discussed in Weber.

The evidence gathered so far suggests that perhaps a reasonable representation for preferences is an aggregate model with simple CRRA utility without rule-of-thumb in aggregating consumption. Estimation of this model is reported in Table 6. The discount rate β , and the risk aversion coefficient ϕ are both significant, ranging from 0.956 to 0.969 and from 0.829 to 1.126, respectively. There is no single rejection for Hansen's $T \times J$ test.

The results in Table 6 for the relative risk-aversion coefficient ϕ are comparable to those in Mulligan, although the ones obtained here are robust to inconsistencies arising from omission of higher-order terms in approximating the euler equation. In terms of empirical results, robustness in this case is critical. If we truly believe in the linear model, and tested for the existence of rule-of-thumb as was done in Table 2, we would have concluded for its existence at the 5% level in four out of six cases. Hence, our best estimates for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers would range from 0.300 to 0.559, in line with the findings of Campbell and Mankiw for the U.S. economy.

4 Conclusions

Our paper has several original contributions to the literature on consumption optimality. First, we provide a new result on the basic rule-of-thumb regression, showing that it is observational equivalent to the one obtained in the optimizing model of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988). Second, for tests based on the Asset-Pricing Equation, we show that the omission of the higher-order term in the log-linear approximation yields inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters when lagged observables are used as instruments. Although Weber (2002) also criticizes these tests on different grounds, our setup offers a much deeper critique

of current rule-of-thumb tests. Third, we show that the nonlinear estimation of a system of N Asset-Pricing Equations can be done efficiently even if the number of asset returns (N) is high vis-a-vis the number of time-series observations (T), which prevents system estimation. We argue that efficiency can be restored by aggregating returns into a single measure that fully captures intertemporal substitution. Indeed, we show that there is no reason why return aggregation cannot be performed in the nonlinear setting of the Pricing Equation, since the latter is a linear function of individual returns. Fourth, aggregation of the nonlinear euler equation forms the basis of a new test of rule-of-thumb behavior, which can be viewed as testing for the importance of rule-of-thumb consumers when the optimizing agent holds an equally-weighted portfolio of returns or a weighted portfolio of returns. We also discuss the similarities between the aggregation method proposed here and Mulligan's (2002) aggregation leading to the capital rental rate.

Our empirical results are:

1. In Tables 1 and 2, the log-linear tests using an aggregate version of the real return to wealth – the capital rental rate – show the usual presence of rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption decisions. However, evidence of the diagnostic tests performed in these regressions show overwhelming signs of misspecification of the linear model due to the omission of the higher-order term. This is particularly troublesome since lagged observables were used as instruments.
2. Non-linear estimation of the aggregate euler equation in Table 3 shows overwhelming signs that $\gamma = 0$ (no habit formation) and $\lambda = 0$ (no rule-of-thumb behavior). When we test separately these two hypothesis (Tables 4 and 5, respectively), Table 4 shows

overwhelming signs that $\gamma = 0$ while Table 5 shows overwhelming signs that $\lambda = 0$.

3. In Table 6 we consider a non-linear aggregate model without rule-of-thumb behavior in consumption and without habit formation. The intertemporal discount factor is significant and ranges from 0.956 to 0.969 while the relative risk-aversion coefficient is precisely estimated ranging from 0.829 to 1.126. There is no evidence of rejection in over-identifying-restriction tests. Taken together, our results show no signs of either rule-of-thumb behavior for U.S. consumers or of habit-formation in consumption decisions once proper econometric tests are performed.

It is important to view our empirical optimality results in perspective. The early literature on consumption found important puzzles such as excess smoothness (sensitivity), the equity-premium puzzle, and rule-of-thumb behavior; see Hall (1978), Flavin (1981), Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983, 1984), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Campbell (1987), Campbell and Deaton (1989), Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990), and Epstein and Zin (1991). These studies used time-series methods applied to aggregate consumption data and disaggregate returns. Later, when panel-data methods were applied to household data and disaggregate returns, the evidence favored optimal behavior; see Runkle (1991), Attanasio and Browning (1995), Attanasio and Weber (1995), and Dynan (2000). Some of these panel-data studies proposed an aggregate-bias explanation for the lack of optimality found in early studies. In a limited linear setting, the work of Mulligan (2002) on cross-sectional aggregation points towards the importance of aggregating returns to measure intertemporal substitution in a representative-agent setting, i.e., with aggregate consumption. Our work shows that aggregation can be done using the Asset-Pricing Equation itself, since the latter is nonlinear on

consumption, but linear on returns. The aggregated Pricing Equation is valid regardless of the number of assets (N) used in estimation and testing, even if $N \rightarrow \infty$ at any rate. It is equivalent to the euler equation of an optimizing representative consumer who hold an equally-weighted or weighted portfolio of traded assets. Therefore, whose return to wealth is $R_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N R_{i,t}$ or $R_t = \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i R_{i,t}$, respectively. When the number assets is large, all idiosyncratic noise vanish in these combinations, since $R_t = \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N R_{i,t}$ or $R_t = \text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{i=1}^N \omega_i R_{i,t}$. For that reason, the latter two are closely related to intertemporal substitution measured with aggregate consumption, a property individual returns seem to lack given the evidence of early studies. Therefore, the message of this paper is that proper return aggregation is critical to study intertemporal substitution in a representative-agent framework. This involves aggregating the nonlinear euler equation and performing estimation and testing using it. In this case, we find no evidence of lack of optimality.

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A Appendix: Tables

Table 1 - Instrumental-Variable Estimation of

$$\Delta \ln(C_t) = \frac{1}{\phi} \ln(\beta) + \frac{\phi}{2} \sigma_\mu^2 + \frac{1}{\phi} r_t + \mu_t$$

C_t	Instruments	$1/\phi$	Sargan	Residual-Test P-values			
Proxy	$\Delta \ln(C_{t-i}),$ r_{t-i}, μ	Robust (s.e.)	Test (p-value)	J.B.	HSK	S. Corr.	BDS
Non-dur.	$i = 1$	0.689	2.337	0.691	0.414	0.129	0.006
and		(0.266)	(0.126)				
Services	$i = 1, 2$	0.741	3.086	0.710	0.430	0.129	0.002
per		(0.255)	(0.379)				
capita	$i = 1, 2, 3$	0.741	3.107	0.710	0.430	0.129	0.002
		(0.254)	(0.684)				
Non-dur.	$i = 1$	0.888	0.002	0.319	0.057	0.214	0.068
per		(0.359)	(0.966)				
capita	$i = 1, 2$	0.994	2.425	0.348	0.057	0.227	0.026
		(0.342)	(0.489)				
	$i = 1, 2, 3$	0.993	2.681	0.348	0.057	0.226	0.026
		(0.342)	(0.749)				

Note: Only $1/\phi$ reported. R_t is Mulligan's (2002) after-tax capital rental rate, r_t defined in (20). Robust S.E.s use Newey and West (1987). Residual tests report the smallest p-value. J.B.: Jarque and Bera's (1987) test. HSK: Heteroskedasticity test: ARCH test with lags 1 and 2. S. Corr.: LM serial correlation, with lags 1 and 2. BDS: Brock et al.'s (1996) independence test – dimensions 2 to 10.

Table 2 - Instrumental Variable Estimation of:

$$\Delta \ln (C_t) = \lambda \Delta \ln (Y_t) + (1 - \lambda) \left(\frac{1}{\phi} \ln (\beta) + \frac{\phi}{2} \sigma_\mu^2 + \frac{1}{\phi} r_t \right) + \mu_t$$

C_t	Instruments	$\frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi}$	λ	Sargan	Residual-Test P-values			
		Proxy	Robust (s.e.)	Robust (s.e.)	Test (p-value)	J.B.	HSK	S. Corr.
Non-dur.	$i = 1$	0.496 (0.322)	0.199 (0.238)	2.680 (0.102)	0.797	0.281	0.199	0.200
and								
Serv.	$i = 1, 2$	0.389 (0.264)	0.300 (0.149)	3.570 (0.467)	0.844	0.229	0.481	0.000
per								
capita	$i = 1, 2, 3$	0.322 (0.255)	0.341 (0.141)	7.183 (0.410)	0.935	0.170	0.729	0.001
Non-dur.	$i = 1$	0.667 (0.691)	0.238 (0.635)	0.001 (0.980)	0.734	0.022	0.078	0.074
per								
capita	$i = 1, 2$	0.361 (0.374)	0.559 (0.225)	0.955 (0.917)	0.616	0.193	0.012	0.019
	$i = 1, 2, 3$	0.389 (0.348)	0.529 (0.199)	4.264 (0.749)	0.727	0.138	0.024	0.030

Note: Only $\frac{(1-\lambda)}{\phi}$ and λ reported. In addition, see note in Table 1.

Table 3 GMM Estimation of Equation (27)

Representative Consumer with Habit Formation and Rule-of-Thumb in Aggregation

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \beta [R_t + \gamma] \left[\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \left(1 - \lambda \frac{Y_{t-1}}{C_{t-1}} \right) \right]^{-\phi} \\ - R_t \beta^2 \gamma \left[\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_{t+1}}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}} \right) \right]^{-\phi} \\ - \left[1 - \lambda \frac{Y_{t-1}}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \left(\left(\frac{C_{t-1}}{C_{t-2}} \right)^{-1} - \lambda \left(\frac{C_{t-1}}{Y_{t-2}} \right)^{-1} \right) \right]^{-\phi} \end{array} \right\} = 0.$$

Consumption Measure	Instruments	β	ϕ	γ	λ	$T \cdot J$	Wald Test
	$ra_{j,t-i}$	Robust	Robust	Robust	Robust	Test	$H_0: \gamma = \lambda = 0$
	R_{t-i}, μ	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(p-value)	(p-value)
Non-durable	$j = 1, 3, 6$	0.974	1.369	0.236	0.074	0.004	4.372
and	$i = 1$	(0.015)	(0.672)	(0.116)	(0.123)	(0.949)	(0.112)
Services	$j = 1, 2, 3$	0.974	1.361	0.240	0.078	0.001	3.562
per	$i = 1$	(0.015)	(0.665)	(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.980)	(0.168)
capita	$j = 3, 4, 5$	0.972	1.285	0.130	0.0462	0.045	0.518
	$i = 1$	(0.009)	(0.452)	(0.196)	(0.173)	(0.832)	(0.772)
Non-durable	$j = 1, 3, 6$	0.955	1.033	-0.023	0.103	0.059	1.971
per	$i = 1$	(0.005)	(0.370)	(0.191)	(0.074)	(0.808)	(0.373)
capita	$j = 1, 2, 3$	0.960	1.041	-0.073	-0.015	0.346	0.325
	$i = 1$	(0.007)	(0.316)	(0.129)	(0.190)	(0.556)	(0.850)
	$j = 3, 4, 5$	0.959	1.010	-0.277	0.0164	0.258	0.545
	$i = 1$	(0.010)	(0.288)	(0.397)	(0.293)	(0.612)	(0.762)

Note: Estimated by GMM. Robust S.E. estimates use Newey and West's (1987) procedure and

pre-whitening. R_t is Mulligan's (2002) after-tax capital rental rate.

Table 4 GMM Estimation of Equation (28)

Representative Consumer with Habit Formation and No Rule-of-Thumb in Aggregation

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \beta [R_t + \gamma] \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \right)^{-\phi} \\ -R_t \beta^2 \gamma \left(\frac{C_{t+1}}{C_{t-1}} - \gamma \frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \right)^{-\phi} - \left(1 - \gamma \frac{C_{t-2}}{C_{t-1}} \right)^{-\phi} \end{array} \right\} = 0.$$

Consumption	Instruments	β	ϕ	γ	$T \cdot J$
Measure	$ra_{j,t-i}$,	Robust	Robust	Robust	Test
	R_{t-i}, μ	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(p-value)
Non-durable	$j = 2, 5, 7$	0.966	0.958	0.208	1.757
and	$i = 1$	(0.005)	(0.232)	(0.108)	(0.415)
Services	$j = 2, 5, 7$	0.965	0.930	0.140	2.612
per	$i = 1, 2$	(0.004)	(0.169)	(0.101)	(0.856)
capita	$j = 2, 5, 7$	0.964	0.881	0.086	4.527
	$i = 1, 2, 3$	(0.002)	(0.106)	(0.103)	(0.920)
Non-durable	$j = 2, 5, 7$	0.956	0.866	0.058	1.033
per	$i = 1$	(0.002)	(0.188)	(0.129)	(0.597)
capita	$j = 2, 5, 7$	0.957	0.845	-0.026	3.284
	$i = 1, 2$	(0.002)	(0.120)	(0.113)	(0.772)
	$j = 2, 5, 7$	0.956	0.790	-0.080	3.913
	$i = 1, 2, 3$	(0.001)	(0.088)	(0.105)	(0.951)

Note: See note in Table 3.

Table 5 Instrumental Variable Estimation of Equation (29)

Representative consumer with CRRA Utility and Rule-of-Thumb in Aggregation

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left\{ \beta \left(\frac{\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} - \lambda \frac{Y_t}{C_{t-1}}}{1 - \lambda \frac{Y_{t-1}}{C_{t-1}}} \right)^{-\phi} R_t - 1 \right\} = 0.$$

Consumption Measure	Instruments	β	λ	ϕ	$T \cdot J$
	$ra_{j,t-i}$	Robust	Robust	Robust	Test
	R_{t-i}, μ	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(p-value)
Non-durable	$j = 1, 2, 4$	0.968	-0.160	1.012	1.371
and	$i = 1$	(0.005)	(0.262)	(0.228)	(0.504)
Services	$j = 1, 2, 4$	0.964	-0.048	0.862	4.367
per	$i = 1, 2$	(0.004)	(0.130)	(0.178)	(0.627)
capita	$j = 1, 2, 4$	0.957	-0.072	0.522	4.338
	$i = 1, 2, 3$	(0.003)	(0.185)	(0.160)	(0.931)
Non-durable	$j = 1, 2, 4$	0.958	0.043	1.040	0.378
per	$i = 1$	(0.009)	(0.153)	(0.394)	(0.828)
capita	$j = 1, 2, 4$	0.956	0.004	0.819	2.698
	$i = 1, 2$	(0.003)	(0.101)	(0.125)	(0.846)
	$j = 1, 2, 4$	0.953	-0.081	0.557	6.381
	$i = 1, 2, 3$	(0.001)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.782)

Note: See note in Table 3.

Table 6 Instrumental Variable Estimation of General Equation (30)

Representative consumer with CRRA Utility and No Rule-of-Thumb in Aggregation

$$\mathbb{E}_{t-1} \left[\beta \left(\frac{C_t}{C_{t-1}} \right)^{-\phi} R_t - 1 \right] = 0.$$

Consumption Measure	Instruments $ra_{2,t-i}, R_{t-i}, \mu$	β Robust (s.e.)	ϕ Robust (s.e.)	$T \cdot J$ Test (p-value)
Non-durable	$i = 1$	0.969 (0.006)	1.048 (0.287)	1.458 (0.227)
and				
Services	$i = 1, 2$	0.964 (0.004)	0.841 (0.193)	3.276 (0.351)
per				
capita	$i = 1, 2, 3$	0.963 (0.004)	0.848 (0.173)	3.900 (0.564)
Non-durable	$i = 1$	0.960 (0.006)	1.126 (0.428)	0.003 (0.954)
per				
capita	$i = 1, 2$	0.956 (0.002)	0.853 (0.138)	1.442 (0.696)
	$i = 1, 2, 3$	0.956 (0.002)	0.829 (0.114)	1.625 (0.898)

Note: See note in Table 3.